The Constitution in Times of National Crisis: Contextualizing Post- September 11 Constitutional Ramifications by Ernst, Julia L.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 88 Number 1 Article 3 
1-1-2012 
The Constitution in Times of National Crisis: Contextualizing Post- 
September 11 Constitutional Ramifications 
Julia L. Ernst 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ernst, Julia L. (2012) "The Constitution in Times of National Crisis: Contextualizing Post- September 11 
Constitutional Ramifications," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 88 : No. 1 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol88/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu. 
         
 
THE CONSTITUTION IN TIMES OF NATIONAL CRISIS:  
CONTEXTUALIZING POST-SEPTEMBER 11 
CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS 
JULIA L. ERNST 
ABSTRACT 
 
In response to the tragic events on September 11, 2001, the United 
States government has shifted the balance between individual liberties, on 
one hand, and national security concerns, on the other.  Some of those 
changes raised important questions concerning the extent to which this 
experience has affected the United States Constitution and the values it 
embodies.  To better understand the frictions between national security and 
fundamental liberties, we must place them into historical context.  This 
Article examines these issues and is based on a presentation for a 
symposium in Bismarck, North Dakota, entitled September 11 Ten Years 
Later:  Impact on the Heartland.  After setting the stage for this Article in 
Part I, Part II examines the underpinnings of the United States Constitution 
and the fundamental liberties that it seeks to protect.  Part III provides a 
historical perspective demonstrating that United States governmental 
policies have swung like a pendulum, both enhancing and constricting civil 
liberties.  Part IV considers reactions in the wake of September 11.  Finally, 
Part V suggests this crisis may be different from previous national crises, 
and questions whether the pendulum will make a full trajectory back to 
protecting civil liberties. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Last year marked the eleventh anniversary of the tragic events of 
September 11, 2001.  Programs across the United States commemorated the 
anniversary.  The organizer of one of these events, Clay Jenkinson, invited 
me to speak at a symposium in Bismarck, North Dakota, held on September 
11, 2011, entitled September 11 Ten Years Later:  Impact on the 
          
2012] THE CONSTITUTION IN TIMES OF NATIONAL CRISIS 53 
Heartland.1  He asked me to discuss the strains on the United States 
Constitution that have arisen in the aftermath of the attacks, particularly 
framing them within the historical context of the Constitution – including 
the values it embodies and its global impact upon the evolution of 
democracies around the world.  He also asked me to highlight other national 
crises the United States has faced over the last two centuries, and the 
constitutional tensions they have caused.2  This Article arises out of that 
presentation.3 
As people throughout the country continue to reflect upon the 
devastating atrocities that occurred on September 11, 2001, the country also 
persists in grappling with the lasting impact these terrorist events made 
upon the nation.  Some changes in response to September 11 have shifted 
the balance between individual liberties, on one hand, and national security 
concerns, on the other.  In particular, responses by the United States 
government have raised important questions concerning the extent to which 
this experience has affected the United States Constitution and the values it 
embodies. 
How have the tragedies of September 11 and their aftermath challenged 
the rights and freedoms that are ensconced in the United States 
Constitution?  Since September 11, 2001, and especially throughout the 
year surrounding the eleventh anniversary, the United States has engaged in 
debates over issues including the Patriot Act4 and the amendments to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,5 the expansion of the definition of 
terrorism,6 the broadened ability of law enforcement to obtain e-mail 
 
1. Symposium, September 11 Ten Years Later:  Impact on the Heartland, September 9-11, 
Bismarck State College (2011).  The symposium was hosted by Bismarck State College with The 
Dakota Institute of the Lewis and Clark Fort Mandan Foundation.  See September 11 Ten Years 
Later:  Impact on the Heartland, http://sandbox.bscsymposium.org/ (last visited June 4, 2012). 
2. Since I teach Constitutional Law at the University of North Dakota School of Law, I was 
delighted to present on this topic.  During the first few weeks of class, my students study the 
origins of and democratic values ensconced within the United States Constitution and its global 
impact.  Later in the semester, they explore some of the post-September 11 tensions between 
individual rights and national security.  Therefore, I extend my deepest gratitude to Clay 
Jenkinson and the other symposium organizers for providing me with this wonderful opportunity 
to discuss these issues with the symposium participants. 
3. This Article does not purport to provide a comprehensive examination of the topics it 
covers.  Instead, it encapsulates a presentation that was intended to provide a primarily non-legal 
audience with a brief overview of the issues, in the hopes of sparking further exploration and 
debate.  Several audience members requested a copy of the presentation, providing the impetus for 
this Article. 
4. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (“USA PATRIOT Act”) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, 115 Stat. 
272 (Oct. 26, 2001). 
5. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885(c) (2006), 
[hereinafter FISA]. 
6. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 802. 
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communications, Internet activities, library records, and other information 
from people who are not suspected of wrongdoing,7 and the increased 
discretion of immigration officials to detain and deport people who have 
immigrated to our country.8  Debates have also emerged over the 
restrictions on habeas corpus under the Patriot Act and subsequent acts,9 
enhanced interrogation techniques,10 indefinite detention of detainees 
without due process protections,11 and the list goes on. 
To better understand the frictions between national security and 
fundamental liberties, we must place them into historical context.  Why was 
the Constitution adopted in the first place, and what principles does it 
embody that have been so cherished by the people of the United States?  
Moreover, what tensions have arisen under previous national crises that 
have tested the Constitution and its ideals since the founding of our nation?  
This Article, based on the presentation for the September 11 symposium, 
provides a brief glimpse into some possible responses to these questions.  
This introduction sets the stage by explaining its genesis in the event 
commemorating the eleventh anniversary of the tragedies and their impact 
on the heartland of America.  Part II examines the underpinnings of the 
United States Constitution and the fundamental liberties that it seeks to 
protect.  Part III provides a historical perspective demonstrating the United 
States governmental policies have swung like a pendulum toward stronger 
measures to enhance national security, but which constrict civil liberties, 
during and immediately after national crises.  This section also describes 
how the hypothetical pendulum has oscillated back toward greater 
protections of civil liberties once the crises have abated.  Part IV considers 
reactions in the wake of September 11 and briefly summarizes some of the 
concerns that have been raised about the government’s responses to these 
events.  Part V concludes by suggesting that this crisis may be different 
from previous national crises, and if so, questions whether the pendulum 
will make a full trajectory back to protecting civil liberties.  The Article 
includes a particular focus on specific events in North Dakota and the 
surrounding region impacting and illustrating the swinging pendulum 
between protection and liberties. 
 
7. Id. § 215 (amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, tit. V, § 501(a)(1)). 
8. Id. § 411, 412. 
9. Id. § 412; Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 
2739 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd to 2000dd-1 (2006)). 
10. Developments in the Law – Presidential Authority, Presidential Power and the Office of 
Legal Counsel, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2090, 2103 (2012). 
11. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412, 115 Stat. 272; Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-163, tit. IX, § 1405, 119 Stat. 3136, 3476 (2006) 
(authorizing the Combatant Status Review Tribunals). 
          
2012] THE CONSTITUTION IN TIMES OF NATIONAL CRISIS 55 
II. GENESIS AND GLOBAL IMPACT OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
September 11 has been considered as an attack upon the core of the 
United States, not only upon its people and upon its physical infrastructure, 
but also upon its democratic values and freedoms – the very principles upon 
which the nation was founded.12  Regardless of whether this perception is 
valid,13 the attacks have had significant, concrete repercussions regarding 
constitutional freedoms within this country.  To provide a broader 
perspective through which we can relate to the events of September 11 and 
their repercussions, it is crucial to recall the founding of the United States 
and the origins of its Constitution.  This section will examine the genesis of 
the Constitution and the freedoms for which the American Revolutionaries 
fought in the 1700s, which are the same fundamental liberties for which our 
country’s military personnel and their families continue to make countless 
sacrifices to preserve. 
A. ORIGINS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The United States was founded upon the fundamental principles of 
limited government, checks and balances, individual liberty, due process of 
the law, and the precept that no person is above the law.14  Through their 
legal heritage from England, the founders of our nation embraced the 
concepts ensconced in the Magna Carta,15 written nine hundred years ago, 
as well as the English Bill of Rights,16 adopted less than a century before 
our own revolution, indicating individuals have certain fundamental rights, 
and also have certain protections against unwarranted governmental 
intrusion.  In addition to these documents, the drafters of the Constitution 
 
12. Richard Briffault, Facing the Urban Future After September 11, 2001, 34 URB. LAW. 
563, 580 (2002) (“The September 11 attacks have been characterized as an attack on democracy 
itself.”). 
13. Robert MacCulloch & Silvia Pezzini, The Roles of Freedom, Growth, and Religion in the 
Taste for Revolution, 53 J. L. & ECON. 329, 329 (2010) (“For example, some have argued that the 
origins of the September 11 World Trade Center attack lie in the perceived illegitimacy of the 
Saudi government and its relationship with the United States.”). 
14. See generally U.S. CONST. 
15. Magna Carta, 1297, 25 Edw. I, c. 9 (Eng.).  The Magna Carta was granted in 1215 by 
King John of England.  See generally BOYD CUMMINGS BARRINGTON, MAGNA CHARTA (1920); 
ANNE PALLISTER, MAGNA CARTA:  THE HERITAGE OF LIBERTY (1971); WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, 
MAGNA CARTA:  LEGEND AND LEGACY (1965); LOUIS B. WRIGHT, MAGNA CARTA AND THE 
TRADITION OF LIBERTY (1976); R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the Ius Commune, 66 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 297 (1999). 
16. An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of 
the Crowne (Bill of Rights), 1688, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.) [hereinafter English Bill of Rights].  See 
Yale Law Sch., Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
17th_century/england.asp (last visited June 4, 2012). 
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may also have drawn upon other British laws, such as the Petition of Right 
of 1628, and the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act.17  Taken together, these historic 
documents guaranteed that people could not be punished by the government 
arbitrarily, but may only be punished through the law of the land, and by 
due process of that law.18  They limited the powers of the government and 
the king, and established that even the king is not above the law.19  The 
colonists brought with them these legal doctrines from England, along with 
others, such as the guarantee of accused persons to a trial by jury, and the 
right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek release from unlawful 
detention.20 
The founders of the United States, based upon their experiences with 
an increasingly despotic king who rejected many of these principles, 
considered these and other rights to be vital safeguards of the people’s 
freedom from arbitrary governmental authority, and brought these 
principles into our system of government.21  The United States Constitution 
– the oldest written constitution in the world22 – was adopted by the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787 and ratified by the states in 1788.23  The 
Bill of Rights was added in 1791 as the first ten amendments to the 
Constitution.24  Our Constitution establishes the separation of powers 
among the three branches of government, providing an elaborate system of 
checks and balances, so that no one branch of government will become too 
powerful and become oppressive of individuals within the United States, 
leading to tyranny over the people and unwarranted restrictions on their 
 
17. Kathleen A. Keffer, Choosing a Law to Live by Once the King is Gone, 24 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 147, 151 (2011).  See generally Mehrdad Payandeh, Constitutional Aesthetics:  Appending 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 87 (2011). 
18. See, e.g., Magna Carta 1225, 9 Hen. 3, c. 29 (“No free man shall be taken, imprisoned, 
disseised, outlawed, banished or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute 
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land.”). 
19. King John entered into the Magna Carta as an agreement with the nobles that the king 
would abide by the laws of England.  Moreover, the English Bill of Rights established that the 
monarchy could not suspend the laws.  Keffer, supra note 17, at 151-52. 
20. Magna Carta 1297, 9 Hen. 3, c. 29; Magna Carta 1225, 9 Hen. 3, c. 29; English Bill of 
Rights, supra note 16.  See generally 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND (1765-1769); Keffer, supra note 17, at 152; SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, THE 
MAJESTY OF THE LAW:  REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 33-35 (2003). 
21. Keffer, supra note 17, at 147; see also Payandeh, supra note 17, at 87. 
22. RUDIGER WOLFRUM & RAINER GROTE, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1971 & Supp.) (providing the dates upon 
which nations adopted their constitutions). 
23. Eric R. Nitz, Comparing Apples to Apples:  A Federalism-Based Theory for the Use of 
Founding-Era State Constitutions to Interpret the Constitution, 100 GEO. L.J. 295, 297 & n.6 
(2011). 
24. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 708 (1789). 
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freedoms.25  The Constitution also enshrines individual rights, such as the 
right to freedom of speech, to petition for habeas corpus, to protection 
against cruel and unusual punishments, to equal protection of the laws, and 
not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.26  
As one specific example, the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.27 
In sum, the Constitution guarantees the protection of the individual against 
undue intrusion and overreaching from the government. 
B. INSPIRATION FOR THE PROLIFERATION OF DEMOCRACIES 
 AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The principles embodied in our Constitution, as well as other 
foundational documents such as the Declaration of Independence, have 
resonated in countries throughout the globe, helping spur an outpouring of 
constitutionalism, democracy, freedom, equality, and systems of 
government that are accountable to the people in many countries during the 
two centuries since its adoption.28  In 1821, in correspondence between two 
of our founding fathers, Thomas Jefferson wrote to John Adams:  “The 
flames kindled on the Fourth of July, 1776, have spread over too much of 
the globe to be extinguished by the feeble engines of despotism; on the 
contrary, they will consume these engines and all who work them.”29 
The United States Constitution and the principles of democracy, 
consent of the governed, restriction of governmental power, freedom of the 
press, and individual liberty, helped spur the revolutions of 1848, known as 
 
25. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I-III; see also Gary Thompson, Guantanamo and the 
Struggle for Due Process of Law, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2011). 
26. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2, amend. I, VIII, XIV. 
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
28. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 
46, 46 (1992); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global 
Constitutionalism, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1163, 1166 (2011); Larry Kramer, Political Organization and 
the Future of Democracy, reprinted in JACK M. BALKIN & REVA B. SIEGEL, THE CONSTITUTION 
IN 2020 (2009). 
29. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Sept. 12, 1821), reprinted in 2 THE 
ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS, 1812-1826, at 575 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959). 
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the Spring of Nations.30  During this time, starting in France and spreading 
across Europe and Latin America, people rose up against the traditional, 
autocratic ruling authorities.31  The Constitution provided inspiration for 
these democratic uprisings.32  Although in most of those countries, it took 
many years to establish a stable democratic system of government, the 
seeds of democracy had been planted and gradually took root. 
The twentieth century witnessed waves of democracy and the adoption 
and strengthening of written constitutions granting rights to citizens 
spreading around the globe.33  The dissolution of the Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian empires after World War I led to at least nominal democracies in 
many of the new nation-states arising throughout Europe.34  Although the 
Great Depression in the 1930s brought a retrenchment of fascism and 
dictatorships,35 the outcome of World War II and subsequent decolonization 
of newly independent countries swung the pendulum back toward a 
resurgence of democracies,36 as did the rise of democracies in Latin 
America during the 1980s,37 the democratic revolutions across Eastern 
Europe in 1989 and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.38 
Moreover, over time, governments that were initially more democratic 
in name than in substance have gradually become more truly democratic.39  
According to Freedom House,40 as of 2011 there were 117 electoral 
 
30. Rett R. Ludwikowski, Searching for a New Constitutional Model for East-Central 
Europe, 17 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 91, 99 (1991). 
31. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and 
Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1093-100 (2010). 
32. A.E. Dick Howard, A Traveler from an Antique Land:  The Modern Renaissance of 
Comparative Constitutionalism, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 3, 7 (2009). 
33. See generally Law & Versteeg, supra note 28. 
34. Franck, supra note 28, at 53-54. 
35. Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship:  Its Dangers and Its 
Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1797-98 (2010). 
36. Franck, supra note 28, at 53-54. 
37. Robert F. Turner, Review Essay:  Coercive Court Action and the Law Regulating Covert 
Action:  Practices, Contexts, and Policies of Covert Coercion Abroad in International and 
American Law, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 427, 440 n.73 (1995) (“In 1979, perhaps a third of the people 
of Latin America lived under governments that were arguably democratic.  By 1986, that figure 
exceeded 90 percent.”). 
38. Id. at 440. 
39. See generally Law & Versteeg, supra note 28.  For a discussion of some of the 
difficulties facing countries in the process of democratization, see generally Geoff Gentilucci, 
Truth-Telling and Accountability in Democratizing Nations:  The Cases Against Chile’s Augusto 
Pinochet and South Korea’s Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo, 5 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 79 
(2005); Muna Ndulo, The Democratization Process and Structural Adjustment in Africa, 10 IND. 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 315 ( 2003). 
40. Freedom House is a non-profit, public interest organization based in the United States 
that “supports democratic change, monitors freedom, and advocates for democracy and human 
rights.”  See Jyllands-Posten Foundation Contributes $50,000 to Freedom House, FREEDOM 
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democracies out of 195 countries (60%), whereas in 1989 only 69 out of 
167 countries could claim this status (41%).41  As a historical comparison, 
in 2011 Freedom House rated 87 countries as “free” (45%), and 60 as 
“partially free” (31%) out of 195 countries, with only 48 countries rated as 
“not free” (24%).42  By contrast, in 1972 only 44 countries were rated as 
“free” (29%), and only 38 were “partially free” (25%) out of 151 countries, 
with 69 countries rated as “not free” (46%).43  Most democracies today 
have written constitutions, many of which have been influenced by the 
United States Constitution and constitutional law jurisprudence.44  
Furthermore, constitutions have increasingly become more protective of 
individual rights and freedoms.45 
 
HOUSE, http://www freedomhouse.org/article/jyllands-posten-foundation-contributes-50000-
freedom-house (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).  According to its website: 
We support nonviolent civic initiatives in societies where freedom is denied or under 
threat and we stand in opposition to ideas and forces that challenge the right of all 
people to be free.  Freedom House amplifies the voices of those fighting for freedom 
in repressive societies.  We work directly with democracy and human rights advocates 
in their own countries and regions.  These reformers include human rights defenders, 
civil society leaders and members of the media.  Freedom House’s programs provide 
these advocates with resources that include training, expert advice, grants and 
exchange opportunities.  We press the United States, other governments, international 
institutions and regional bodies to adopt consistent policies that advance human rights 
and democracy around the world. 
About Us, FREEDOM HOUSE, http://www freedomhouse.org/about-us (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). 
41. ARCH PUDDINGTON, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2012:  THE ARAB UPRISINGS AND THEIR 
GLOBAL REPERCUSSIONS 29 (2012), available at http://www freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/ 
inline_images/Electoral%20Democracy%20Numbers%20FIW%201989-2012--Draft_0.pdf. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Worldwide Influence of the United States 
Constitution as a Charter of Human, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1 (1991); David M. Golove & Daniel J. 
Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation:  The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the 
Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2010); Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-
Model:  The United States Constitution and the “Rise of World Constitutionalism,” 2000 WISC. L. 
REV. 597; Law & Versteeg, supra note 28. 
There is a growing literature on the influence of American constitutionalism on other 
nations.  That literature usually focuses on the construction of domestic authority and 
the degree to which other nations have patterned their constitutions on that of the 
United States.  The ongoing work of the Comparative Constitutions Project takes a 
different approach, measuring the incidence of common provisions in all national 
constitutions since 1789.  The connection between the very process of constitution-
making and recognition, however, suggests a previously unrecognized influence of the 
United States on global constitutionalism — not necessarily its particular structures or 
doctrines, but the drafting and implementation of a constitution itself as part of the 
process of obtaining international recognition. 
Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 44, 1062 n.451 (citations omitted). 
45. See generally Law & Versteeg, supra note 28. 
One phenomenon that can easily be documented, for example, is rights creep, or the 
fact that the number of rights found in the average constitution is increasing over time.  
A related phenomenon is that of generic rights constitutionalism:  a growing set of 
rights is common, or generic, to nearly all constitutions. 
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Additionally, the past year has witnessed the Arab Spring – a new 
wave of protests sweeping through the Middle East, rising up against 
dictatorships and demanding democratic reforms.46  Throughout history, 
millions of people have given their lives in their fight for their freedom and 
their rights, and many more continue to make tremendous sacrifices today. 
C. INFLUENCE ON HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
In addition to the rise of democracies in countries around the world, the 
United States Constitution and the principles underpinning it have also 
helped shape the development of international law, particularly 
international human rights and humanitarian law.47  For example, the 
Geneva Conventions, to which the United States is a party, set forth the 
standards of humanitarian treatment that countries must provide to prisoners 
of war, such as the right to a fair trial before a regularly constituted court for 
persons accused of war crimes, protection of the rights of prisoners, and the 
prohibition of torture and inhumane treatment.48  The rights espoused in the 
 
Id. at 1247; see also Luís Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere:  Human Dignity in 
Contemporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 331 
(2012). 
[C]ountries that are newcomers to the rule of law often draw upon the experience of 
more seasoned democracies.  In the past several decades, waves of democratization 
have spread across the world, including Europe in the 1970s (Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain), Latin America in the 1980s (Brazil, Chile, and Argentina), and Eastern and 
Central Europe in the 1990s.  The U.S. Supreme Court, the German Constitutional 
Court, and other similar national courts serve as significant role models for these new 
democracies. 
Barroso, supra note 45, at 343. 
46. See generally PUDDINGTON, supra note 41.  Recall the regime change in Tunisia, Egypt, 
and Libya, civil uprisings in Syria and Yemen and Bahrain, and major protests in Algeria, Iraq, 
Jordan, and Morocco.  Id. at 16-20. 
47. See generally Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and International 
Human Rights Law, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. 53 (1990). 
48. The four Geneva Conventions and two protocols include the following:  Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (First Geneva Convention); Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (Second Geneva 
Convention); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (Third Geneva Convention); Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
(Fourth Geneva Convention); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 (Protocol I); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609 (Protocol II).  Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention is known as “Common 
Article 3” because it is common to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  Geneva Convention 
(III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 
3364 [hereinafter Common Article 3].  It provides: 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights,49 drafted in part by Eleanor 
Roosevelt, are fundamentally the same as those in the United States 
Constitution.50  Under the Convention Against Torture,51 which President 
Ronald Reagan signed in 1988 and the Senate ratified in 1990,52 the United 
States and other nations have committed to prohibit torture against any 
person, to take active measures to prevent torture, and to prohibit the 
transfer of detainees to countries where they may be subjected to torture.  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,53 which the 
United States also joined under the administration of President George 
Herbert Walker Bush in 1992,54 guarantees civil and political rights of 
individuals, including the right to due process and fair and impartial trials, 
the right to presumption of innocence until proven guilty, freedom from 
 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be found to 
apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:  (1) Persons taking no active part in 
the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and 
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall 
in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on 
race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.  To this 
end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place 
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:  (a) violence to life and 
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) 
taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and 
degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all 
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.  (2) 
The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
Common Article 3, supra note 48, at art. 4. 
49. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/811 at 71 
(1948). 
50. David Sloss, Legislating Human Rights:  The Case for Federal Legislation to Facilitate 
Domestic Judicial Application of International Human Rights Treaties, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
445, 467 (2012). 
The principles embodied in the Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] are not 
“foreign” or “alien” concepts.  They are fundamental American values, codified in the 
US Constitution, and then restated in the Universal Declaration and other international 
human rights instruments.  Although the specific language included in international 
human rights treaties is slightly different from the language of the US Constitution, the 
underlying values are the same. 
Id. 
51. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 UNTS 85 (signed 10 
December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987). 
52. Daniel L. Pines, Rendition Operations:  Does U.S. Law Impose Any Restrictions?, 42 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 523, 544 (2011). 
53. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 
23, 1976). 
54. Michael J. Perry, A Right to Religious Freedom:  The Universality of Human Rights, The 
Relativity of Culture, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 385, 387 n.6 (2005). 
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arbitrary arrest and detention, the right to habeas corpus, the right to 
privacy, the prohibition of torture and of cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
punishment, as well as the right to equality, democracy, political 
participation, freedom of thought, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, 
and freedom of assembly.  The rights guaranteed in these international 
treaties are reflective of the very rights guaranteed by our own United States 
Constitution, which has provided an amazing legacy to the world.55 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL TENSIONS DURING PREVIOUS 
NATIONAL CRISES 
Of course, governments find it easier to protect individual rights and 
liberties during times of peace than in times of war.  Our nation has 
witnessed the recurrent testing of constitutional protections during times of 
national crises.  It is important to contextualize the responses of our 
government after September 11 by examining some of the other critical 
moments in our nation’s history.  Such challenges to constitutional 
protections have occurred, for example, during the Quasi War of 1798, the 
Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War, among others.  
Broadly speaking, in times of national emergencies, our government has 
tended to erode constitutional values in favor of augmenting its own power 
in the name of protecting the national security of the country.56 
A. QUASI WAR OF 1798 
Consider the events that occurred shortly after our country’s founding, 
during the Quasi War of 1798 between the United States and France, and 
the challenges they posed to the separation of powers ensconced within the 
Constitution to ensure that no one branch of government seizes too much 
 
55. Unfortunately, the United States Constitution is not currently perceived to be as 
influential internationally as it has been in the past.  Part of this decline may be attributable to the 
fact that so many other written constitutions ensconcing civil rights and liberties have burgeoned 
around the world, thereby diluting the effect of our own.  Another reason may be the tarnished 
reputation of the United States with respect to its human rights record as a result of the torture 
scandals in recent years.  Moreover, the failure of United States judges to consider and cite the 
constitutions of other democratic nations throughout the world may cause judges and other policy 
makers in other countries, in turn, to ignore the United States Constitution.  Furthermore, the 
perceived policy of isolationism by the United States government may exacerbate these issues.  
For an analysis of American exceptionalism, see CATHERINE POWELL, A Tale of Two Traditions:  
International Cooperation and American Exceptionalism, in THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
103, 103-19 (William F. Schulz ed., 2008). 
56. Joseph Margulies, Evaluating Crisis Government, 40 No. 6 CRIM. LAW BULL. 627, 631 
(2004) (“The essential pattern of executive overreaction, judicial acquiescence, and official regret 
is correct as far as it goes.”). 
          
2012] THE CONSTITUTION IN TIMES OF NATIONAL CRISIS 63 
power.57  During this episode of our nation’s history, the United States 
proclaimed neutrality with respect to the hostilities then raging between 
England and post-Revolution France.58  This declaration infuriated the 
French, which had supported the colonies during the American Revolution 
and had entered into two treaties with the new nation.59  The French navy 
began seizing American ships trading with Great Britain.  In response, 
Congress passed a law authorizing the United States Navy to attack French 
warships.60  Today, proponents of expanded presidential authority 
sometimes refer to the Quasi War of 1798 to justify broad executive war 
powers and unilateral war-making by the president.61  Yet during the Quasi 
War, President John Adams was generally acting pursuant to this legislation 
passed by Congress that authorized the United States naval activities 
against France.62 
 
57. Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication:  War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 931, 1005 n.527 (1999). 
It could be argued (and has been argued) that the framers’ model was appropriate for 
the eighteenth century but not for contemporary times, when it is important to 
concentrate greater power in the President to respond promptly to national 
emergencies, including terrorist attacks.  The framers were fully aware of such 
arguments and rejected them.  Living in a time of crisis and emergency, they decided 
to vest in Congress the core powers over war and spending.  Other than granting the 
President the power to repel sudden attacks, they relied for their safety primarily on 
Congress.  As noted in one study: 
Despite glib assertions of the novelty and gravity of the post-Korean war period, 
the threats confronting the United States during the first quarter century of 
government under the Constitution imperiled the very independence and survival 
of the nation.  The United States Government fought wars against France and 
England, the two greatest powers of that period, to protect its existence, preserve 
the balance of power, and defend its commerce.  Notably, both conflicts, the 
Franco-American War [the Quasi-War of 1798-1800] and the War of 1812, were 
authorized by statute. 
Id. at 1005 (quoting David S. Friedman, Waging War Against Checks and Balance — The Claim 
of an Unlimited Presidential War Power, 57 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 213, 228 (1983)). 
58. J. Gregory Sidak, The Quasi War Cases – and Their Relevance to Whether “Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal” Constrain Presidential War Powers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 
480-82 (2005). 
59. Id. 
60. Id.  An Act to Suspend the Commercial Intercourse between the United States and 
France, and the Dependencies Thereof, ch. 53, § 1, 1 Stat. 565, 565 (1798); An Act in Addition to 
the Act More Effectually to Protect the Commerce and Coasts of the United States, ch. 62, § 1, 1 
Stat. 574, 574 (1798); see also An Act to Authorize the Defense of Merchant Vessels of the 
United States Against French Depredations, ch. 60, §1, 1 Stat. 572, 572 (1798). 
61. Louis Fisher, Lost Constitutional Moorings:  Recovering the War Power, 81 IND. L.J. 
1199, 1233 (2006).  For example, the Federalist Society has promoted the concept of a “Unitary 
Executive, a doctrine that places all executive power directly under the President and leaves no 
room for independent commissions, independent counsels, congressional involvement in 
administrative details, or statutory limitations on the President’s power to remove executive 
officials.”  Id. 
62. Sidak, supra note 58, at 480-82. 
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There is an instance, however, where President Adams attempted to go 
beyond his authority as authorized by Congress.  In part of the authorizing 
statute mentioned above, Congress legislated that the Navy was authorized 
to seize American vessels sailing to any French port in order to prevent 
American goods from being transported to France.63  President Adams 
unilaterally expanded that law, and he authorized the Navy to seize vessels 
sailing either to or from any French port.64  Under the President’s 
authorization, United States Navy Capitan George Little had seized a vessel 
that he had thought was American (although it actually turned out to be 
Danish) that was traveling away from a French port, so the action was not 
authorized by the statute.65  Captain Little was sued for damages, and the 
case was appealed to the Supreme Court.66  Safeguarding the principle of 
the separation of powers and rejecting the aggrandizement of presidential 
authority, the Court held an order of the President that is in contradiction 
with an act of Congress is illegal as it is beyond the proper authority of the 
President granted by the Constitution.67  The President does not have 
inherent powers that permit him to ignore a law passed by Congress.68  
Chief Justice John Marshall reasoned that the Constitution gives the power 
to make laws to the legislative branch of government, and gives the power 
to enforce those laws to the executive branch.69  Therefore, when the 
President attempts to go beyond the authority of legislation, he is acting 
unconstitutionally, and his actions are void.70 
 
63. Louis Fisher, Basic Principles of the War Power, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 319, 330 
(2012) (indicating the Quasi-War of 1798 “underscored the primary role of Congress over war.”). 
64. Id. (emphasis added). 
65. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 176 (1804). 
66. Id. 
67. Fisher, supra note 61, at 1236 (“[T]he Court decided that when a collision occurs in time 
of war between a presidential proclamation and a congressional statute, the statute trumps the 
proclamation.”). 
68. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists:  Is the Court 
Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1975, 1987 n.48 (2009). 
In the seminal case of Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), the Marshall 
Court acknowledged the President’s vast discretion in directing the military and his 
inherent power to meet emergencies, but indicated that Congress in authorizing a war 
(here, against France) could specify certain boundaries on the President’s conduct.  
Accordingly, the President did not have independent Article II power to go beyond the 
explicit legislative directive to seize ships going “to” French ports by ordering the 
seizure of all ships going “to” and “from” France. 
Id. 
69. Fisher, supra note 63, at 330 (“The policy decided by Congress in a statute necessarily 
prevailed over conflicting presidential orders.  Congress not only initiated wars but through 
statutory action could define their scope and purpose.”). 
70. Roy E. Brownell II, The Coexistence of United States v. Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown 
Sheet & Tune v. Sawyer in National Security Jurisprudence, 16 J.L. & POL. 1, 58 n.225 (2000) 
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Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled Capitan Little could be held 
personally liable for violating the statute under the President’s orders.71  
Justice Marshall stated: 
I was strongly inclined to think that . . . in consequence of orders 
from the legitimate authority [i.e., from the President, that] . . . the 
claim of the injured party for damages would be against that 
government from which the orders proceeded . . .  But I have been 
convinced that I was mistaken, and I have receded from this first 
opinion.  I acquiesce in that of my brethren, which is, that the 
instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction, or legalize 
an act which – without those instructions – would have been a 
plain trespass.72 
In this case, Justice Marshall was upholding two Constitutional principles 
that had been adopted by the nation’s founders:  first, the Constitution’s 
commitment to separation of powers, so the President does not become too 
powerful and usurp the lawmaking authority of Congress;73 and second, the 
principle that no person is above the law, even if that person is acting 
illegally because they are following the orders of a superior.74 
B. CIVIL WAR 
As another example, during the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln 
unilaterally suspended the writ of habeas corpus, which enables a prisoner 
to seek a legal determination as to whether the imprisonment is lawful.75  At 
first, President Lincoln ordered the suspension only in a limited region of 
 
(“The Court concluded that the President’s order was legally void because he had misinterpreted 
the statute.”). 
71. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 170.  (“A commander of a ship of war of the United 
States, in obeying his instructions from the President of the United States, acts at his peril.  If 
those instructions are not strictly warranted by law he is answerable in damages to any person 
injured by their execution.”). 
72. Id. at 179. 
73. But see Sidak, supra note 58, at 499 (“The conventional wisdom about the Quasi War 
cases, and of the now-archaic words in the War Clause concerning letters of marque and reprisal, 
is incorrect.  The Quasi War cases concern national sovereignty and supremacy, not the separation 
of powers.”). 
74. John F. Pries, The False Promise of the Converse-1983 Action, 87 IND. L.J. 1697, 1736 
(2012). 
75. Andrew Franz, “Shall Not Be Suspended, Unless . . . ”:  A Tale of Habeas Corpus, 43 
No. 3 Crim. Law Bull. 330, 335 (2007) (“Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of habeas corpus during 
the early phases of the Civil War is a classic example of our judiciary’s weakness during times of 
war.  The Civil War was the earliest indication that our judicial system’s traditional role of 
defending minority interests might go by the wayside during war, be it civil, foreign or domestic.” 
(citation omitted)).  For a general discussion, see generally BRIAN MCGINTY, THE BODY OF JOHN 
MERRYMAN:  ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS (2011); MARK E. 
NEELY, JR. THE FATE OF LIBERTY:  ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991). 
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the country to protect the Union troops.76  Union troops arrested John 
Merryman, a farmer and state senator, because he was in favor of secession 
and allegedly had participated in destroying railroad bridges.77  Justice 
Roger Taney ignored President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus and 
ordered the military produce Merryman before the court.78  The military 
and the President refused to honor the court’s order, so Justice Taney 
declared President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus to be 
unconstitutional, because the authority to suspend habeas corpus is held by 
Congress, not by the President.79  Congress had initially refused to pass 
legislation approving the suspension of habeas corpus, and several lower 
federal courts also ruled the President’s suspension was unconstitutional 
without Congressional approval.  In February of 1862, President Lincoln 
issued another proclamation releasing many of the prisoners and providing 
them with amnesty for engaging in “disloyal and treasonable practices.”80  
However, a few months later, responding to opposition to conscription into 
the Union Army, President Lincoln issued a nationwide suspension of 
habeas corpus, directing very broadly: 
Now, therefore, be it ordered, First – That during the existing 
insurrection and as a necessary measure for suppressing the same, 
all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors within the 
United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, 
resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, affording 
aid and comfort to Rebels against the authority of the United 
States, shall be subject to martial law and liable to trial and 
punishment by courts martial or military commissions: 
Second – That the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in respect to 
all persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the 
rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal, military 
 
76. Margulies, supra note 56, at 630. 
77. Paul Finkelman, Limiting Rights in Times of Crisis:  Our Civil War Experience – A 
History Lesson for a Post-9-11 America, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 25, 33-41 
(2003).  For additional discussions of John Merryman and the suspension of habeas corpus, see 
MARVIN R. CAIN, LINCOLN’S ATTORNEY GENERAL:  EDWARD BATES OF MISSOURI 144-45 
(1965); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CIVIL LIBERTY AND THE CIVIL WAR, THE GAUER 
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, 49-65 (1997). 
78. Finkelman, supra note 77, at 33-41. 
79. Ex-parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). 
80. Alissa C. Wetzel, Beyond the Zone of Twilight:  How Congress and the Court Can 
Minimize the Dangers and Maximize the Benefits of Executive Orders, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 385, 
393-94 n.39 (2007). 
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prison, or other place of confinement by any military authority or 
by the sentence of any court martial or military Commission.81 
That order gave tremendous discretion to anyone in the military to 
imprison people who were suspected of any “disloyal practice” for the 
entire duration of the warfare and without any recourse.82  Shortly 
thereafter, Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863,83 
validating President Lincoln’s proclamation and ending the constitutional 
controversy.  But throughout the course of the Civil War, over thirteen 
thousand Americans – some estimates range as high as thirty-eight 
thousand – whose loyalty to the Union was questioned were arrested and 
held by the military without charges and without judicial review.84 
After the Civil War ended, the act authorizing the suspension was no 
longer in effect, and Congress subsequently passed a new law largely 
restoring the writ of habeas corpus.85  In 1866, the Supreme Court decided 
in Ex Parte Milligan86 that Congress’s suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus during the Civil War did not authorize the President to convict 
citizens before military tribunals where the civil courts were open and 
functioning.87  Instead, the government should indict Milligan under the 
criminal code and try him in an Article III court with a trial by jury.88 
C. WORLD WAR I 
As another example, consider the circumstances which arose during 
World War I.89  The First World War had led to a dramatic expansion of 
 
81. Proc. No. 1, 13 Stat. 730 (1862).   
82. Franz, supra note 75, at 335-36 (“Lincoln’s orders were based on his conviction that 
fundamental rights could be violated if the very existence of the union and the legal order were at 
stake.  The Congress did nothing but ratify these actions, which served only to further strengthen 
the President’s confidence in such matters.  Lincoln went on making unilateral proclamations, 
decrees and edicts-including the rescission of habeas corpus, fundamental speech, and association 
rights-and causing the most vaguely conceived disloyalties to be classified as crimes against the 
state.”). 
83. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 18, 12 Stat. 755. 
84. Noa Ben-Asher, Legalism and Decisionism in Crisis, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 699, 717 (2010); 
Margulies, supra note 56, at 631; Nancy Murray & Sarah Wunsch, Civil Liberties in Times of 
Crisis:  Lessons from History, 87 MASS. L. REV. 72, 74 (2002). 
85. But see Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) (involving the arrest of a newspaper 
editor, where act allowing Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus appeals was repealed, 
but court still had jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1789). 
86. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
87. See generally Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
88. But see Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1942) (holding that unlawful combatants 
who violate the laws of war, including both foreign and United States citizens, may be tried and 
punished by military tribunals that had been authorized by Congress). 
89. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:  FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM 
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004). 
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governmental powers and responsibilities in the United States,90 and led to 
new laws intended to reinforce the war effort.  As one of these new laws, 
Congress passed the Espionage Act of 191791, which among other things, 
criminalized the opposition to military recruitment with punishment of up 
to twenty years in prison and fines of up to ten thousand dollars.92  In 1918, 
Congress then passed the Sedition Act, which criminalized numerous 
additional types of speech, such as “any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or 
abusive language about the form of government of the United States, or the 
Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval forces of the 
United States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the Army 
or Navy.”93  Despite these attempts to quell dissent, the United States 
intervention in the war, as well as the Wilson Administration itself, had 
become intensely unpopular in the United States during this period.94  Many 
people voiced their displeasure with the war and the administration both 
orally and in writing.  In response, under the new espionage and sedition 
laws, the federal government responded harshly.  For example, postal 
censors removed publications from circulation that were critical of the 
government,95 and many people were sentenced to long prison terms for 
making statements that were deemed “unpatriotic.”96  The government 
prosecuted approximately two thousand people under the Espionage Act 
resulting in nearly one thousand convictions.97 
In an incident not far from the symposium in Bismarck, Kate O’Hare 
was arrested by federal authorities for delivering a speech opposing the war 
in Bowman, North Dakota, and was given a five-year sentence and ten 
thousand dollar fine for violating the provision of the statute criminalizing 
interference with military recruitment.98  Other examples abound.  In South 
 
90. James W. Ely, Jr., Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 
371, 388 (2010). 
91. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 793-94 (2006)). 
92. Id. § 3, 219. 
93. Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, § 3, 40 Stat. 553, 553-54. 
94. H.C.F. BELL, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PEOPLE 228 (1945) (discussing the 
difficulties faced by the Wilson Administration). 
95. Danley K. Cornyn, The Military, Freedom of Speech, and the Internet:  Preserving 
Operational Security and Servicemembers’ Right of Free Speech, 87 TEX. L. REV. 463, 470 n.59 
(2008). 
96. Kevin L. Cope, Defending the Ivory Tower:  A Twenty-First Century Approach to the 
Pickering-Connick Doctrine and Public Higher Education Faculty After Garcetti, 33 J.C. & U.L. 
313, 319 (2007). 
97. Margulies, supra note 56, at 631. 
98. Kathleen Kennedy, Manhood and Subversion During World War I:  The Cases of 
Eugene Debs and Alexander Berkman, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1661, 1694-96 (2004); Kathleen Hall, File 
Sessions:  Archival Court Records in Higher Education, 75 UMKC L. REV. 25, 27-28 (2006). 
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Dakota, the government arrested and convicted twenty-seven farmers “for 
sending a petition to the government calling the war a ‘capitalist war’ and 
objecting to the draft quota for their county.”99  The Federal government 
arrested Eugene Debs in Ohio for a speech decrying the United States 
involvement in the First World War and encouraging people to resist the 
draft, and he was sentenced to ten years in prison.100  The film producer, 
Robert Goldstein, was also sentenced to ten years in prison for making a 
film, called “The Spirit of ‘76,” because it depicted cruelty by British 
soldiers during the American Revolution, which was deemed to be 
potentially detrimental to our ally during World War I, and resulted in his 
conviction for aiding and abetting Germany via this film.101  Poet E.E. 
Cummings was arrested and subjected to a military detention camp for 
professing a denial of antipathy toward Germans. 
During the first Red Scare, government officials subjected an estimated 
ten thousand foreign citizens to arrest, imprisonment, beatings, and forcible 
confessions because of their political beliefs.102  Such raids were carried out 
in over thirty cities.103  Several people were also convicted for distributing 
leaflets in opposition to sending United States troops to Russia and United 
States efforts to impede the Russian Revolution.104  Moreover, United 
States Attorney General Mitchell Palmer used the Sedition Act to deport 
 
99. MICHAEL LINFIELD, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE:  U.S. CIVIL LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF WAR 45 
(1990). 
100. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212-13 (1919); Kennedy, supra note 98, at 
1685-702; Andrew Green, Silence in the Courtroom, 24 LAW & LITERATURE 80, 90-92 (2012); 
see also JEREMY COHEN, CONGRESS SHALL MAKE NO LAW:  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT, AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 114 (YEAR). 
101. Robert N. Strassfeld, “Lose in Vietnam, Bring the Boys Home,” 82 N.C. L. REV. 1891, 
1897 (2004); Geoffrey R. Stone, Roy R. Ray Lecture:  Freedom of the Press in Time of War 1667, 
59 SMU L. REV. 1663, 1667 (2006); Tom Donnelly, A Popular Approach to Popular 
Constitutionalism:  The First Amendment, Civic Education, and Constitutional Change, 28 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 321, 365-66 (2010); see also Goldstein v. United States, 258 F. 908, 911 (9th 
Cir. 1919). 
102. Hollis V. Pfitsch, The Executive’s Scapegoat, the Court’s Blind Eye?  Immigrants’ 
Rights after September 11, 11 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 151, 167 (2005); Brian 
McGiverin, In the Face of Danger:  A Comparative Analysis of the Use of Emergency Powers in 
the United States and the United Kingdom in the 20th Century, 18 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
233, 248-49 (2008); Jim Cornehls, The USA Patriot Act:  The Assault on Civil Liberties, Z 
MAGAZINE, July 2003, reprinted in THE PATRIOT ACT:  OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 77, 84 (Louise I. 
Gerdes ed., 2005). 
103. Pfitsch, supra note, at 102; Cornehls, supra note 102, at 84. 
104. See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); see also Steven J. 
Heyman, The Dark Side of the Force:  The Legacy of Justice Holmes for First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 661, 679 (2011). 
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several hundred foreign citizens from the United States because of their 
political beliefs.105 
After World War I ended, the restrictions upon freedom of speech and 
political belief began to ease.106  President Wilson commuted Robert 
Goldstein’s sentence; President Warren G. Harding later commuted Kate 
O’Hare’s and Eugene Debs’ sentences; and other prisoners had their 
sentences commuted as well.107  In 1921 Congress repealed the Sedition 
Act.108  Once again, the pendulum of government policies swung back 
toward greater protections for political and civil liberties of the people once 
the crisis abated.109 
D. WORLD WAR II 
As another example, remember the internment of thousands of innocent 
people of Japanese, German, and Italian descent during World War II.110  
Over one hundred ten thousand people of Japanese ancestry living on the 
Pacific Coast and other regions of the United States were forcibly interned 
in War Relocation Camps after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.111  President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt had signed Executive Order 9066 in 1942 mandating 
 
105. Julia Rose Kraut, Global Anti-Anarchism:  The Origins of Ideological Deportation and 
the Suppression of Expression, 19 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 169, 191 (2012); Theodore Y. 
Blumoff, The Marketplace of Ideas in Cyberspace, 51 MERCER L. REV. 817, 818 (2000). 
106. McGiverin, supra note 102, at 249. 
107. Margulies, supra note 56, at 630-31; Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press:  
Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 311, 337-38 (2011). 
108. McGiverin, supra note 102, at 248-49. 
109. Geoffrey R. Stone, Wikileaks and the First Amendment, 64 Fed. COMM. L.J. 477, 479 
(2012). 
Over time, we have come to understand that these episodes from our past were 
grievous errors in judgment in which we allowed fear and anxiety to override our good 
judgment and our essential commitment to individual liberty and democratic self-
governance.  We have come to understand that, in order to maintain a robust system of 
democratic self-governance, our government cannot constitutionally be empowered to 
punish speakers, even in the name of national security without a compelling 
justification. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
110. Franz, supra note 75, at 330-46 (“The power and the rhetoric of war increased during 
World War II, with the arbitrary internment of law abiding American citizens of Japanese descent-
an internment approved by the judiciary for the sake of the most remotely perceived effect on the 
war effort.”).  See generally CHARLES MCCLAIN, THE MASS INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE 
AMERICANS AND THE QUEST FOR LEGAL REDRESS (1994); GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE 
PRESIDENT:  FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS (2001). 
111. George Kawamoto, Mentoring for a Public Good, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 361, 
365 n.24 (2011).  In addition, approximately eleven thousand German-Americans and three 
thousand Italian-Americans were also incarcerated.  Philip A. Thomas, Emergency and Anti-
Terrorist Powers, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1193, 1212-13 (2003). 
          
2012] THE CONSTITUTION IN TIMES OF NATIONAL CRISIS 71 
the internment.112  Two-thirds of the people who were incarcerated in the 
camps were citizens of the United States.113  Many of the Japanese 
detainees were held in deplorable conditions.  Fred Korematsu, a Japanese-
American citizen, and some others decided to remain in their homes and not 
to comply with the order.114  Upon his arrest, Mr. Korematsu argued the 
executive order was a violation of equal protection and of the right to due 
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.115  In 
1944, the Supreme Court upheld his conviction and the government’s 
policy mandating the internment in Korematsu v. United States,116 although 
this decision has subsequently been regarded as a low point in the court’s 
history.117  Moreover, critical evidence indicating the internment was not a 
military necessity, and the vast majority the people who were imprisoned 
were not a military threat, was wrongfully withheld by the government in 
this case.  Decades later, Fred Korematsu’s conviction was overturned 
through a coram nobis retrial.118  A presidential commission indicated the 
government’s actions had been based on “race prejudice, war hysteria, and 
a failure of political leadership.”119  President Ronald Reagan signed 
 
112. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407, 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942); Kawamoto, supra note 
111, at 365 n. 24. 
113. Cornehls, supra note 102, at 85.  In the decades leading up to this action, other 
government acts ensconcing racism as an official policy had been taken, heightening an overall 
climate of prejudice.  For example, California passed an anti-miscegenation law in 1905 
forbidding marriages between Caucasians and East Asians.  Hrishi Karthikeyan & Gabriel J. Chin, 
Preserving Racial Identity:  Population Patterns and the Application of Anti-Miscegenation 
Statutes to Asian Americans, 1910-1950, 9 ASIAN L.J. 1, 26-27 (2002).  In 1924, Congress passed 
the Asian Exclusion Act, prohibiting immigration of East Asians.  James A. Long, Genetic Plastic 
Surgery:  How Neoeugenics Creates a Culture of Stage Moms, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 203, 204 n.5 
(2009) (citing the Asian Exclusion Act, also known as the Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 
139, 43 Stat. 153). 
114. See generally Lorraine K. Bannai, Taking the Stand:  The Lessons of Three Men Who 
Took the Japanese American Internment to Court, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 1 (2005). 
115. Id. 
116. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
117. G. Edward White, Determining Notoriety in Supreme Court Decisions, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 
197, 202-04 (2011); Carl T. Bogus, What Does the Second Amendment Restrict?  A Collective 
Rights Analysis, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 508 (2002) (“The confinement of Americans of 
Japanese descent during the Second World War has come to be considered a national disgrace.”). 
118. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1406 (granting a writ of coram nobis, which vacated Fred 
Korematsu’s previous conviction due to the government’s concealment of critical exculpatory 
evidence in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).  See Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Korematsu v. United States:  A Tragedy Hopefully Never to be Repeated, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 163, 
172 (2011). 
119. Roger Daniels, Bringing Governments to Justice, 18 ASIAN AM. L.J. 147, 154 nn.16-18 
(2011) (quoting Commission on the Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, 102d Cong. 
457 (1992)). 
The broad historical causes which shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war 
hysteria and a failure of political leadership.  Widespread ignorance of Japanese 
Americans contributed to a policy conceived in haste and executed in an atmosphere 
of fear and anger at Japan.  A grave injustice was done to Americans and resident 
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legislation in 1988 apologizing on behalf of the United States for the 
injustice that was done by the internment.120  The government has also paid 
over $1.6 billion in reparations to those who had been interned and their 
heirs.121 
At the symposium addressing September 11 where I spoke last year in 
Bismarck, a professor in the audience later showed me one of the barracks – 
now located on the Bismarck State College campus – that had once been 
used to hold prisoners at the Fort Lincoln Internment Camp in North 
Dakota during World War II.122  It was haunting to see in person.  Fort 
Lincoln was the largest internment camp in the United States, holding an 
estimated 3850 detainees.123  In addition to German and Italian seamen and 
United States residents of Japanese descent, Fort Lincoln imprisoned people 
who were caught up in the Latin American Detention Program during 
World War II, where residents of countries in Latin America with ties to 
Germany were arrested and taken to the United States to be held in 
detention for the duration of the war.124  Despite subsequent government 
acknowledgment of the lack of evidence that they were Nazi sympathizers, 
thousands of people were detained and separated from their families for 
years, and many had their property confiscated by the government.125  In 
October of 2003, the North Dakota Museum of Art hosted an exhibit called 
Snow Country Prison memorializing the internment of the detainees at Fort 
Lincoln.126 
 
aliens of Japanese ancestry who, without any individual review or probative evidence 
against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the United States during World 
War II. 
Id. 
120. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. § 1989 (1988); see generally Eric K. Yamamoto 
& Ashley Kaiao Obrey, Reframing Redress:  A “Social Healing through Justice” Approach to 
United States-Nagive Hawaiian and Japan-Ainu Reconciliation Initiatives, 16 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5 
(2009). 
121. Kawamoto, supra note 111, at 365 n.24. 
122. See generally Brian Gehring, Internment Camp Barracks Building May Have New 
Home, BISMARCK TRIB. (Oct. 30, 2011), http://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/internment-camp-
barracks-building-may-have-new-home/article_a811efa8-01ab-11e1-846e-001cc4c002e0 html 
(describing the barracks at Fort Lincoln that held American citizens of Japanese and German 
descent during World War II). 
123. Fort Lincoln Internment Camp, BISMARCK CAFÉ, http://www.bismarckcafe.com/blogs 
/fort-lincoln-internment-camp (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). 
124. Cindy G. Buys, Nottebohm’s Nightmare:  Have We Exorcised the Ghosts of WWII 
Detention Programs or Do They Still Haunt Guantanamo?, 11 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 
8-12 (2011). 
125. Id. 
126. German American Internee Coalition, http://www.gaic.info/camp_doj html#fortlincoln 
(last visited on June 12, 2012); Martha Nakagawa, Snow Country Prison Exhibit Opening Brings 
Internees Back to Internment Camp, FOIT TIMES (Nov. 18, 2003), http://www foitimes.com/ 
internment/Snow%20Prison htm. 
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E. COLD WAR 
As a final example (although many others could also be explored), 
during the Cold War, the House Un-American Activities Committee 
(HUAC) conducted an extensive investigation of suspected Communists 
and ostensible “fellow travelers.”127  Led by Senator Joseph McCarthy, the 
committee subpoenaed thousands of people who were forced to testify 
about the political affiliations and activities of themselves and others or face 
imprisonment.128  People who refused to sign “loyalty oaths” or who did 
not testify satisfactorily before HUAC lost their livelihoods without due 
process protections.129  The government undertook other measures that 
restricted freedom of expression and association.130  James E. Leahy, who 
 
127. Corey Robin, Fragmented State, Pluralist Society:  How Liberal Institutions Promote 
Fear, 69 MO. L. REV. 1061, 1065-67 (2004); Cornehls, supra note 102, at 85.  See generally 
ROBERT K. CARR, THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES:  1945-1950 (1952). 
128. Charlotte H. Taylor, Hate Speech and Government Speech, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1115, 
1170-72 (2010); Cornehls, supra note 102, at 85. 
129. Cope, supra 96, at 320; Murray & Wunsch, supra note 84, at 80; Cornehls, supra note 
102, at 85.  Lee Hall, Disaggregating the Scare from the Greens, 33 VT. L. REV. 689, 713 n.135 
(2009) (“[W]itnesses were not provided with the rights they would be entitled to even in a civil 
trial, although their livelihoods were at stake.  ‘Witnesses were frequently confronted with 
accusations from unidentified informants and denied any opportunity to confront their accusers or 
to present their own witnesses.’”) (quoting David Cole, The New McCarthyism:  Repeating 
History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 10-14 (2003)). 
130. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech and National Security, 84 IND. L.J. 939, 949-50, 
954 (2009). 
The long shadow of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) fell 
across our campuses and our culture . . . .  In 1954, Congress enacted the Communist 
Control Act, which stripped the Communist Party of all rights, privileges, and 
immunities.  Hysteria over the Red Menace produced a wide range of federal and state 
restrictions on free expression and association.  These included extensive loyalty 
programs for federal, state, and local employees; emergency detention plans for 
alleged subversives; pervasive webs of federal, state, and local undercover informers 
to infiltrate dissident organizations; abusive legislative investigations designed to 
harass dissenters and to expose to the public their private political beliefs and 
association; and direct prosecution of the leaders and members of the Communist 
Party of the United States. 
Id. 
The article subsequently notes that “On May 30, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft . . . once 
again authorized FBI agents to monitor political and religious activities without any showing that 
unlawful conduct might be afoot.”  Id.; see also Hall, supra note 129, at 713 n.135. 
In 1952, Congress authorized and funded detention centers for suspected subversives 
in Arizona, California, Florida, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania.  Thus, for more than a 
generation after World War II the federal government planned to detain ‘dangerous’ 
citizens and foreigners wholly outside the criminal process, and the FBI accordingly 
engaged in widespread political spying until the 1970s – not for any criminal law 
purpose, but simply so that it could maintain lists of suspicious persons to be detained 
in a future emergency.  In the 1960s, the FBI’s list included civil rights and anti-war 
movement activists, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting David Cole, The New McCarthyism:  Repeating History in the War 
on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 10-14 (2003)). 
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graduated from the University of North Dakota School of Law in 1949, 
presented a book to the law school that he wrote entitled, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT, 1791-1991:  TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF FREEDOM, in which 
he recounts that: 
The late 1940s and early 1950s were turbulent years in our history, 
an era during which the country was engaged in a prolonged 
witch-hunt for subversives.  Public employees, and especially 
teachers, were required to take a loyalty oath pledging that they 
did not advocate the overthrow of the government and were not 
members of any organization that did so advocate; members of the 
Communist party were prosecuted for allegedly advocating the 
overthrow of the government; some teachers were required to list 
every organization to which they belonged during the previous five 
years, and the House of Representatives created the House Un-
American Activities Committee, which conducted an ongoing 
investigation of subversive activities in the country.  Even the 
writers and producers of motion pictures came under scrutiny 
during an investigation to see if there were Communists in 
Hollywood.131 
Of this period, Elwyn Brooks White wrote “[t]he most alarming 
spectacle today is not the spectacle of the atomic bomb in an unfederated 
world, it is the spectacle of the Americans beginning to accept the device of 
loyalty oaths and witch-hunts, beginning to call anybody they don’t like a 
Communist.”132  Leahy continues, “[d]uring these times when the country 
was obsessed with ferreting out subversives, the rights protected by the 
First Amendment – the right openly to advocate one’s views, no matter how 
unpopular, and to associate with whomever one chose, no matter how 
unacceptable they might be – took a severe beating.”133 
But again, once the anti-Communist hysteria subsided, the pendulum 
shifted back toward greater protections for individual rights, and this 
episode has become viewed as a less than shining moment in our country’s 
history.134  In the words of one scholar, who compares the government’s 
actions during the Cold War with the government’s actions after September 
 
131. JAMES E. LEAHY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 1791-1991:  TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF 
FREEDOM 112-13 (1991) (on the first page of the book in the UND Law Library is the handwritten 
inscription:  “May 1, 1991, To the University of North Dakota School of Law.  James E. Leahy, 
Class of 1949”). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Taylor, supra note 128, at 1171 (discussing the fact that, “[d]espite the near-universal 
condemnation of HUAC and McCarthy era anti-Communist tactics, no doctrinal rule prevents 
Congress from dusting them off for use again”). 
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11, “[i]n short, just as we did in the McCarthy era, we have offset the 
decline of traditional forms of repression with the development of new 
forms of repression.  A historical comparison reveals not so much a 
repudiation as an evolution of political repression.”135 
These events are just a few examples of instances in which our 
Constitutional values of individual freedom, checks and balances, 
separation of powers, and limitations on the potential for abuse of 
government power have been put to the test when our nation has been 
confronted with national emergencies.  As they demonstrate, often the 
immediate response to a national crisis is to impose restrictions upon civil 
liberties, and for the government to strengthen its grip on the handles of 
power.  These examples also show us that, while the pendulum may swing 
away from protection of individual rights during the crisis, at least in the 
past, it subsequently has a tendency to swing back toward greater protection 
of those freedoms once the crisis has receded.136 
IV. POST-SEPTEMBER 11 RESPONSES AND STRAINS ON 
THE CONSTITUTION 
Turning now to September 11 and its aftermath, we understand 
inherent tensions must be balanced between protecting civil liberties and 
protecting national security.  These tensions are not merely academic, as is 
our study of constitutional issues that have happened in the distant past, 
beyond the personal memories of most people living today.  These tensions 
are very real, and are deeply felt within all of us, due to our lived 
experiences of September 11. 
A. RECALLING PERSONAL EXPERIENCES 
Of course, each of us can clearly remember that day.  This symposium 
has encouraged us to share our stories through the 100 Stories Project and 
throughout the event,137 so I, too, will share a glimpse of mine.  On the 
drive into my office in Washington, DC that morning, I learned of the first 
airplane hurtling into the World Trade Center, and a colleague at work 
 
135. Cole, supra note 129, at 2. 
136. As another example, the legal doctrine that permitted the government to restrict freedom 
of speech if that speech had a tendency to incite or cause illegal activity eventually evolved into 
the incitement to imminent lawless action standard, which is more protective of the freedom of 
speech.  See the Supreme Court’s decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969). 
137. DVD:  100 Stories Project, September 11 Ten Years Later:  Impact on the Heartland 
(Dusty Anderson 2011) (according to the cover of the DVD, “[i]n preparation for the symposium 
BSC collected stories from North Dakotans and from visitors to our great state describing 
[September 11] from their individual perspectives.  The stories relayed to us are collected here as 
a tribute to the shared experience of a day that changed us all”). 
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informed me of the second.  My husband was consulting that day at Fort 
McNair, which is a military establishment across the Potomac River from 
the Pentagon, and he saw the smoke rising up from the third airplane that 
had hit the Pentagon.  My thoughts, of course, immediately turned to his 
safety when I learned about the attack at the Pentagon.  The devastation 
continued with Flight 93 crashing in Pennsylvania. 
Three pilots from the North Dakota Air National Guard, who were 
serving at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, immediately launched their 
F-16 fighter planes, and we took comfort in their defense of the capitol as 
they circled the skies around Washington, D.C. throughout the day of the 
attacks.  I was pleased to be able to thank personally one of those pilots, Lt. 
Col. Dean Eckmann, who also spoke at the symposium on September 11 in 
Bismarck.  On the morning of September 11, I was supposed to have a 
conference call with my colleagues in my organization’s New York office, 
which is on Wall Street a few blocks from Ground Zero.  I spoke with them 
briefly, as they were shutting down the office in the midst of the smoke, 
dust and debris that was blanketing New York City.  My supervisor was at 
Reagan National Airport a few miles from the Pentagon about to fly from 
Washington, DC to New York that morning, and of course her flight was 
grounded.  The government imposed an emergency shutdown, not only of 
air traffic across the country, but also of ground transportation in 
Washington, DC, so I walked with my colleagues to one of their nearby 
apartments and waited for hours watching the news. 
Once the emergency traffic shutdown in Washington was lifted and we 
could return home, as my husband and I drove past the smoldering 
Pentagon that afternoon, our hearts joined with millions of Americans 
throughout the country – and with sympathetic neighbors throughout the 
world – who resolved to prevail over the terrorists who had wrought this 
unthinkable tragedy.  In Washington, D.C. and across the country we 
wondered what may be targeted next – the White House, Capitol, other 
military or civilian establishments, other cities and states?  We also 
wondered in what forms the next attacks may come – bioterrorist attacks on 
public water supplies, detonation of nuclear bombs, explosions on trains or 
subways?  American flags sprang up throughout the nation’s capital – on 
overpasses above the highways, on automobile windows and bumpers, on 
porches, hats and t-shirts.  We all felt an urgent imperative to strengthen our 
country’s protection from another attack and to pursue the network of 
terrorists who were involved in bringing about this devastation. 
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B. THE PATRIOT ACT AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES 
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, Congress and the 
administration leapt into action.  One week after the attacks, the Bush 
Administration submitted the “Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
Act of 2001,” otherwise known as the Patriot Act, to Congress and urged 
them to enact it immediately and without change.138  The bill passed the 
Senate without floor debate and the House with relatively minor changes.139  
Only Senator Russell Feingold voted against the bill in the Senate, and only 
66 Representatives voted against it in the House, compared to 357 voting in 
favor.140  President Bush signed the 342-page bill into law on October 26, 
2001, just six weeks after the attacks.141 
Among other changes to federal law, the Patriot Act of 2001 reduced 
restrictions over intelligence gathering that could take place within the 
United States; broadened law enforcement agencies’ ability to search e-mail 
communications, Internet activities, and other records; expanded the 
definition of terrorism; and so on.142  Proponents of the Patriot Act have 
claimed it provided the federal government with enhanced tools to fight 
against terrorists and to prevent terrorist attacks from occurring in the 
future.143  However, opponents of certain provisions in the law have raised 
concerns that it authorized the government to watch over the shoulders of 
its own citizens without probable cause, and reduced the checks and 
balances on potential governmental overreaching in many areas.144  
Opponents have also questioned the constitutionality of some of these 
provisions.  Debates about these issues, and about what should be the 
 
138. USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Richard Henry Seamon, 
Domestic Surveillance for International Terrorists:  Presidential Power and Fourth Amendment 
Limits, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 449, 486, n.157 (2008).  See 147 Cong. Rec. S11,020 (daily ed. 
Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Senator Feingold indicating that the Bush Administration’s “pressure 
[on Congress] to move on this bill quickly, without deliberation and debate, has been relentless.”). 
139. THE PATRIOT ACT:  OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 14 (Louise I. Gerdes ed., 2005).  But see 
Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After USA Patriot Act:  The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 607, 607 (2003). 
140. 147 Cong. Rec. H 7,224 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2001); 147 Cong. Rec. S11,059-60 (daily ed. 
Oct. 25, 2001). 
141. Daniel E. Lungren, A Congressional Perspective on the Patriot Act Extenders, 26 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 427, 429 (2012); THE PATRIOT ACT, supra note 139, at 
14-17. 
142. USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, 115 Stat. 272, 296-342 (2001). 
143. Tom Ridge, Dir. of Homeland Security, Address at the Allegheny County Emergency 
Operations Center (July 15, 2004), reprinted in THE PATRIOT ACT, supra note 139, at 20-27; see 
also THE PATRIOT ACT, supra note 139, at 14 (noting Department of Justice support). 
144. THE PATRIOT ACT, supra note 139, at 14 (noting American Civil Liberties Union 
opposition). 
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appropriate balance between national security and civil liberties, have 
continued across the United States since September 11.145  These 
controversies have resulted in some changes to the original version of the 
Patriot Act, but other sections, as well as new provisions, remain 
contested.146  This section discusses a few examples of the more 
controversial provisions in the Patriot Act as originally enacted in the weeks 
following September 11 as the government’s immediate response to the 
crisis. 
The Patriot Act significantly expanded the permissible parameters of 
clandestine domestic surveillance of United States citizens by the federal 
government.  Previously, the government had to obtain a warrant from a 
special court established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) by demonstrating probable cause that a United States citizen was 
acting as an “agent of a foreign power” before it could initiate 
surveillance.147  Congress had originally enacted FISA in 1978 after two 
congressional investigations revealed “that the executive branch had 
consistently abused its power and conducted domestic electronic 
surveillance unilaterally and against journalists, civil rights activists, and 
members of Congress (among others) in the name of national security.  
Mindful of these abuses, Congress originally strictly limited FISA’s 
scope,”148 in an attempt to balance the government’s intelligence gathering 
with civil liberties. 
However, under the Patriot Act’s changes to FISA, the government no 
longer needs to demonstrate that the United States citizen is an “agent of a 
foreign power.”149  Instead, federal officials could obtain a warrant in the 
FISA court to seek information concerning a United States person, that 
relates to the ability of the United States to protect against actual or 
potential attack or that relates to “clandestine intelligence activities.”150  
Moreover, the purpose of the surveillance no longer has to be primarily a 
foreign intelligence-gathering activity, but could now have primarily a law 
enforcement purpose with intelligence-gathering being only secondary.151  
 
145. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT:  THE CONSTITUTION IN A 
TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006). 
146. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, § 115, 120 Stat. 192, 211-13 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3511 (2006)). 
147. THE PATRIOT ACT, supra note 139, at 14-17. 
148. Hina Shamsi & Alex Abdo, Privacy and Surveillance Post-9/11, HUMAN RTS., Winter 
2011, at 7. 
149. THE PATRIOT ACT, supra note 139, at 14-17. 
150. Id. 
151. Robert C. Power, “Intelligence” Searches and Purpose:  A Significant Mismatch 
between Constitutional Criminal Procedure and the Law of Intelligence-Gathering, 30 PACE L. 
REV. 620, 664 (2010) (“After the USA-PATRIOT Act amendment, FISA now reverses the 
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These changes provide the government with a substantial expansion of 
authority.  Under the new law, virtually anyone in the United States could 
be subject to broad surveillance, arguably weakening the pre-September 11 
construction of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures without probable cause.152 
Additionally, the Patriot Act allows federal agents to seek warrants that 
encompass broad surveillance of a specific individual, rather than requiring 
a warrant for a particular e-mail account, cell phone, or telephone line.153  
The warrant now follows the individual, regardless of location or the 
communication device being used.  Civil rights advocates are concerned 
this provision may encourage nationwide judge shopping, where federal 
agents will seek warrants only from judges who are most likely to grant 
them; rather than being required to obtain the warrant from the court where 
the individual is located.154 
As another issue, prior federal law did not expressly address warrants 
for Internet searches, whereas the Patriot Act allows federal agents to obtain 
a surveillance warrant to obtain the Internet addresses visited by a person 
under investigation.155  By way of comparison, the federal law regarding 
telephone lines has permitted federal authorities to obtain general 
surveillance warrants in order to tap telephone lines, but only for purposes 
of determining which telephone numbers were calling in and were being 
called – not to listen into the conversations themselves (again unless there 
was a particularized search warrant issued against a suspect for probable 
cause).156  By contrast, with respect to the Internet, the new law allows the 
government to obtain the Internet addresses of the websites the subject is 
visiting, and therefore the government knows the content and information 
contained in those websites.157  Advocates of privacy and civil liberties 
have suggested that such broad searches are more akin to listening into the 
 
relationship, purporting to legitimate FISA searches in which the foreign intelligence purpose is 
‘significant,’ but secondary to a law enforcement purpose.”). 
152. John Podesta, USA Patriot Act:  The Good, the Bad, and the Sunset, HUMAN RTS., 
Winter 2002, reprinted in THE PATRIOT ACT, supra note 139 at 147, 153; THE PATRIOT ACT, 
supra note 139, at 14-17; Lisa Ugelow & Lance J. Hoffman, Fighting on a New Battlefield Armed 
with Old Laws:  How to Monitor Terrorism in the Virtual World, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1035, 
1046-47 (2012). 
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content of telephone conversations (which would be a Constitutional 
violation without a specific warrant upon proof of probable cause), and 
therefore question the constitutionality of such significantly broadened 
surveillance of citizens who are not suspected of committing crimes.158 
The Patriot Act also changed the law to allow government officials to 
enter and search the homes of private citizens without notifying them 
beforehand, called a “sneak-and-peek” search.159  Federal agents would 
now be able to secretly enter a family’s home while they are not there, 
download their computer files, rummage through their possessions, plant 
listening devices, and seize any items they choose.160  And under the Act, 
the individuals would only be notified after the fact, sometimes not for a 
significant time period.161  Again, this provision has raised questions of 
constitutionality and of appropriateness in a democratic society.162 
Concern has also been expressed with respect to libraries under the 
Patriot Act.  Although the Patriot Act does not specifically address libraries, 
it authorizes federal agents to secretly collect tangible records of any kind, 
which would include circulation records, computer usage, and other data 
concerning library patrons, on the assertion of a federal agent that the 
patrons are part of a terrorism investigation (they do not have to be a 
suspect, but simply part of the investigation).163  Previously, unless they 
were able to demonstrate probable cause, the FBI had only been able “to 
obtain bank records, credit records and certain other commercial records 
[and even those] only upon some showing that the records requested related 
to a suspected member of a terrorist group.”164  Law enforcement officers 
had only been able to obtain other records (besides bank records, credit 
records, and certain other commercial records) with a subpoena after 
demonstrating probable cause.165 
Under the Patriot Act, the government no longer needed to have any 
evidence that the people under investigation were members of a terrorist 
group or were otherwise suspected of engagement in terrorism, but could 
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now acquire entire databases on innocent people.166  Opponents of this 
provision of the Patriot Act have argued the government’s requests for 
warrants to conduct these searches are not subject to rigorous judicial 
scrutiny, as the government no longer needs to demonstrate probable cause 
and the scope of the investigations are no longer focused but can be 
expansive.167  Librarians can be compelled to cooperate with the FBI in 
providing information and monitoring Internet usage.168  Furthermore, gag 
orders can be imposed upon the librarians, who are forbidden from telling 
anyone that a search has been conducted or that records were handed over 
to the government – and forbidden even from contacting their own attorney 
to seek legal advice on what to do about the situation.169  The new law 
forbade them from consulting anyone.170  As the past has demonstrated, the 
FBI has previously had a history of infiltrating and monitoring law-abiding 
groups that were considered by the government to be controversial, 
including Martin Luther King Jr.’s Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, which was advocating for racial justice.171  Again, librarians 
and others have protested this expanded power of the government to 
investigate the reading and Internet habits of United States citizens who are 
not suspected of wrongdoing. 
People have also expressed concern that the definition of terrorism has 
been expanded to include “domestic” as well as international terrorism.172  
The Act defines “domestic terrorism” to include any activities that: 
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any State; [that] (B) appear 
to be intended . . . (ii) to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; . . . and (C) occur primarily within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.173 
Questions have been raised as to whether this broadened definition of 
support for terrorism may encompass actions such as charitable 
contributions made to pro-life organizations like Operation Rescue, or to 
environmental organizations such as Greenpeace, which have both had a 
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few extremist members in the past who have resorted to violent 
measures.174 
Under their expanded investigative authority, federal agents have also 
scrutinized expressions of political dissent.  For example, while at his local 
gym in San Francisco, a sixty-year old retired man commented that he 
thought the Iraq war was prompted by a concern for oil and corporate 
profits instead of terrorism.175  Shortly thereafter, the FBI came to his home 
to question him about his political views.176  Bureau agents also visited a 
college student in North Carolina for displaying a poster in her home in 
opposition to President Bush’s position on capital punishment during his 
term as the governor of Texas.177 
Proponents of the Patriot Act assert these enhanced surveillance 
mechanisms are necessary to help prevent terrorist attacks in the future.  
President George W. Bush stated at the signing ceremony that the previous 
law “was written in an era of rotary telephones,” and the new law is updated 
to enable surveillance of new technological methods of communication.178  
The Patriot Act particularly concerns the Internet as a new method of 
perpetrating crime.  Indeed, the Defense Department alone is the subject of 
tens of thousands of cyber attacks each year, and the dangers that cyber 
crime pose to our military and our economy are potentially massive.179  
Additionally, under the old laws, federal agents had to seek new search 
warrants for each new state or district in which they were conducting an 
investigation on an individual; whereas under the new law the warrants are 
valid across all states and districts, making it much easier to pursue a 
subject.180 
Advocates of civil liberties have questioned some of the Patriot Acts’ 
provisions, although they too support many of the other changes to federal 
law contained within this legislation.  They have suggested authorization to 
obtain such a broad array of information against United States citizens, 
without a particularized search warrant indicating the place to be searched 
and without probable cause, is an unconstitutional invasion of American 
citizens’ privacy.  Advocates are concerned the federal government, 
particularly the executive branch, is no longer subject to as rigorous judicial 
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oversight as it previously had been.181  They are concerned the expanded 
definition of terrorism will sweep in a much broader range of activities.  
People have also expressed concern that the government may use its 
expanded surveillance authority to monitor and record information about 
guns and gun ownership, even when the gun owners are not suspected of 
any illegal activity.182 
Indeed, a coalition of both conservative and liberal advocates came 
together in the years after its enactment to question the wisdom of some of 
the Patriot Act’s provisions regarding domestic surveillance.183  Alongside 
liberal groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union, influential 
conservatives such as Grover Norquist (President of Americans for Tax 
Reform), David Keene (President of the American Conservative Union); 
Lori Waters (Executive Director of the Eagle Forum); and former 
Republican Congressman Bob Barr from Georgia (who was previously a 
manager of the House’s impeachment process), have all questioned certain 
provisions of the Patriot Act for giving the government too much power 
with too much secrecy and stripping citizens of basic rights to privacy and 
civil liberties.184  These principles resonate with people throughout the 
United States, as we continue to hear people call for smaller government 
and for less governmental intrusion into personal lives.  Former Republican 
House Majority Leader Dick Armey from Texas had also worked to modify 
several portions of the bill before it was passed, and later labeled the United 
States Department of Justice under Attorney General John Ashcroft as “the 
biggest threat to personal liberty in the country.”185  Republican 
 
181. For a discussion of the assertion that “law does little to constrain the modern executive,” 
see ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:  AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 15 (2010); SCOTT M. MATHESON, JR., PRESIDENTIAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN PERILOUS TIMES 6 (2009) (“Bush’s pursuit of unchecked unilateral 
power without regard to legislative and constitutional restraints and without respect for the roles 
of the other branches of government sets his administration apart.”). 
182. Burt Cohen, A Liberal’s Conservative Case Against President Bush, N.H. UNION 
LEADER, Oct. 27, 2004, at A13 (“Gun owners in New Hampshire have reason for concern.  In 
addition to giving the government expanded authority to get the personal records of citizens – 
books you take out of the library, where you go on the Internet, financial and medical records – 
the feds, thanks to Bush and John Ashcroft's Patriot Act, can now much more easily gain access to 
all information regarding who buys, sells, or owns a gun.  It's no wonder the National Rifle 
Association has joined the opposition to this anti-constitutional legislation.”). 
183. Ponnuru, supra note 165, at 90. 
184. Jake Tapper, Conservative Constitutional Catfight!  Right-wing Activists Team Up with 
the Left-wing ACLU to Bash the PATRIOT Act; The Justice Department is Not Amused, SALON 
(Apr. 11, 2003), http://www.salon.com/2003/04/11/aclu_7/; Ponnuru, supra note 165, at 90; 
Adrian Vermeule, Emergency Lawmaking After 9/11 and 7/7, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1171-72 
(2008). 
185. Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1196 (2006); POSNER & VERMEULE supra note 181, at 1171-72 (2008).  
Although representing Texas in Congress, Dick Armey grew up in North Dakota, and earned his 
          
84 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:51 
Congressman Don Young from Alaska has been quoted as saying on a call-
in show on Alaska Public Radio that the USA PATRIOT Act was the 
“worst act we ever passed.”186 
The government also implemented other controversial responses in the 
wake of September 11.  For example, Attorney General John Ashcroft 
issued an order to the Bureau of Prisons entitled “Monitoring of Attorney-
Client Communications of Designated Federal Prisoners,” which permits 
the government to listen to conversations between lawyers and their clients 
that had previously been privileged.187  Some travelers have objected to the 
pat-down searches and body-scanning technologies at airports that the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has implemented under the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, perceiving them to be 
publicly humiliating physical violations invading their right to privacy.188 
In addition to raising concerns about the civil liberties of United States 
citizens, the government’s policies after September 11 have also 
significantly impacted the lives of thousands of foreign citizens and their 
families.  Professor David Cole of Georgetown University has raised 
questions about the government’s treatment of immigrants – particularly its 
policies targeting Muslim, Arab, and South Asian immigrants.189  After 
September 11, the Attorney General obtained unilateral authority – at his or 
her own discretion – to detain citizens of other countries in the United 
States for an unspecified period of time, and without a hearing.190  Even if 
the detained individual was allowed a hearing and an immigration judge 
ruled the person should be released, new regulations allowed the prosecutor 
to keep him locked up, simply by filing an appeal of the release order, with 
no showing that the appeal is likely to succeed.191  It allowed the federal 
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government to imprison foreign citizens indefinitely, even when they have 
prevailed in their judicial hearings.192 
In the aftermath of September 11, the government detained over twelve 
thousand people in investigating the attacks193 – with some estimates 
ranging as high as five thousand people,194 refusing to release information 
about those who were detained, including their identities.  Their families 
and friends had no idea what was happening to them.  The government tried 
hundreds of immigrants in secret proceedings, closed not only to the public 
and press, but also to family members of those who were detained.195  Many 
people were locked up and deported.196  Many were imprisoned for months 
without being charged or allowed to see their families before finally being 
released.197  Civil liberties advocates believe that these measures were in 
violation of the right to due process, and question the prudence of these 
policies on practical grounds.198 
C. THE CONSTITUTION AND DETAINEES 
The treatment of detainees who have been captured by the United 
States has also raised troubling questions.199  We can all recall the 
“enhanced interrogation techniques” that had been used against some 
prisoners, which were alleged to have caused “severe pain or suffering” that 
would constitute torture under the International Convention Against Torture 
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that the United States has ratified, as well as violate United States law.200  
We remember the vivid photographs depicting the abuse faced by prisoners 
at Abu Ghraib, as well as other individuals who have come forward with 
allegations of maltreatment.201  Martin Breaker, who graduated from the 
University of North Dakota School of Law in 2011, previously served as a 
commanding officer in Iraq in the aftermath of the scandal of prisoner abuse 
at the United States military facility at Abu Ghraib, and has spoken publicly 
about his experiences.202  In 2003, after thirty-two years of military service 
in both active and reserve duty, he retired from the Army Reserve, but once 
the Abu Ghraib events surfaced, he volunteered to return to duty serving in 
Iraq from 2005 to 2008, because he wanted “to help restore American honor 
and dignity that had been tarnished.”203  Colonel Breaker attributed the Abu 
Ghraib scandal to a “failure of leadership,” and recounted, “[h]e helped 
institute a program of hygiene, medical care and education ‘to win the 
hearts and minds’ of Iraqis.”204 
Fortunately, the government subsequently renounced those enhanced 
interrogation techniques.  In 2005, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment 
Act205 sponsored by Senator John McCain, who had himself been subjected 
to torture as a former prisoner of war.206  This Act explicitly mandated that 
all captives held by the United States will be protected against torture.207  
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The Obama Administration has also indicated that it will abide by the 
Geneva Conventions and has repudiated the use of torture.208 
Concern has also been raised about United States policy concerning the 
continued detention of “enemy combatants,” as they were known under the 
Bush Administration, or “unprivileged enemy belligerents,” as they are 
known in the Obama Administration.209  According to the Executive 
Branch, this terminology signifies that the individual is a civilian who has 
directly engaged in armed conflict against the United States in violation of 
the laws of war.210  The administrations under both President Bush and 
President Obama have claimed that such a person may be detained for the 
duration of the hostilities, and that the Geneva Convention protections do 
not apply to that individual.  In the years since September 11, untold 
numbers of extrajudicial prisoners have been held by the United States 
government, both in known locations such as Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as 
well as in covert interrogation sites in other regions of the world.211 
Questions have also been raised about the Constitutional right to Due 
Process of detainees who are held by the United States.  Two months after 
the September 11 attacks, President Bush announced that captives held by 
the United States could be tried by military commissions, instead of by the 
civilian federal court system.212  The following year, the detention camp at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was established to hold such detainees.213  The 
President asserted that the Joint Resolution for the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force against Terrorists, enacted shortly after September 11, 
provided the authority to detain combatants indefinitely to prevent their 
return to the battlefield.214  Moreover, the administration indicated that 
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since the detainees were not on United States soil, the Constitution did not 
apply to them, and therefore they had no access to United States courts to 
review the legality of their detention.215  The administration also asserted 
that anyone to whom it gave the designation “enemy combatant” was not 
covered by the Geneva Convention protections, and therefore did not have 
access to counsel, the right to a trial, or even knowledge of the charges 
against them.216  In the following years, relatives and friends of the 
detainees filed habeas corpus cases in the federal courts to challenge the 
constitutionality of the administration’s actions. 
The first of these to reach the Supreme Court was Rasul v. Bush217 in 
2004, where the petitioners had been imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay for 
over two years without any charges brought against them, without any trial 
or conviction, and where they denied that they engaged in or plotted acts of 
aggression against the United States.  In the case, the Supreme Court held 
the Executive Branch did not have the authority to deny the detainees 
access to the United States justice system, the detainees have a right to 
petition for habeas corpus, and the Executive Branch must provide the 
detainees with the opportunity to hear and refute the evidence brought 
against them that caused them to be classified as “enemy combatants.”218  
Even though Cuba retained “ultimate sovereignty” over Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base, the United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction 
and control, and therefore it will be considered within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States for purposes of habeas petitions.219 
That same year, the Supreme Court heard Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,220 in 
which a United States citizen, who had been captured in Afghanistan, was 
being detained indefinitely in naval brigs in Virginia and South Carolina, as 
an “illegal enemy combatant,” without any formal charges, without any 
oversight of the determination of his status, and without access to an 
attorney or to the courts.221  The Supreme Court ruled in this case that, 
under the Due Process Clause, United States citizens must be able to 
challenge their classification as an “enemy combatant,” by receiving notice 
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of the factual basis for their classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the 
government’s factual assertions before an impartial decision maker.  Justice 
O’Connor noted in the majority opinion “[i]t is during our most challenging 
and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is 
most severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our 
commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.”222 
As a result of Rasul and Hamdi, the Defense Department established 
the Combatant Status Review Tribunals to determine whether detainees 
held by the United States were correctly designated as “enemy 
combatants.”223  When Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005,224 it restricted the detainees’ right to petition for habeas corpus in 
federal courts, limiting the judiciary’s ability to review the tribunals’ 
decisions.225  In 2006, the Supreme Court heard Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,226 in 
which the court held these military commissions were not valid because 
their structures and procedures violated both the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice and the Geneva Conventions.227  If the President were to convene 
military commissions, they must be convened pursuant to a statute passed 
by Congress (not just a Department of Defense order), or sanctioned by the 
laws of war as codified by Congress in the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, and the military commissions failed to meet either of these 
criteria.228  Nor was there anything in the legislation passed in the aftermath 
of September 11 authorizing the war efforts – the Joint Resolution for the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force against Terrorists – that would have 
authorized the President to establish these military commissions.229  
Moreover, the Court held the congressional limitations on habeas corpus 
only applied to petitions filed after the enactment of the Detainee Treatment 
Act of 2005, not to those that had been filed previously.230 
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Shortly after this decision, Congress passed the Military Commission 
Act of 2006,231 which authorized the detainees to be tried by military 
commissions, and which retroactively restricted detainees’ right to petition 
for habeas corpus in federal courts.  However, it did not formally suspend 
habeas corpus under the Constitution.232  The lawyers advocating for the 
rights of the detainees believed the procedures established by this statute 
were still deficient, so they went back to the courts. 
In 2008, the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush233 ruled that the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 unconstitutionally limited the rights of 
detainees to access judicial review in violation of the Suspension Clause of 
the Constitution, and once again held detainees have the right to challenge 
their detention in the federal courts.234  At that point, some of the detainees 
had been held at Guantanamo for six years without judicial determination as 
to their status.235  The government again argued that since Guantanamo Bay 
was under the sovereignty of Cuba, the detainees were not within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, and therefore they had no constitutional 
rights.236  The Court reiterated its holding in Rasul, indicating because the 
United States government had complete jurisdiction and control over 
Guantanamo Bay, it had de facto sovereignty, and therefore the 
constitutional protections do apply to the prisoners being held there.237  
Moreover, the Court held the Military Commissions Act unconstitutionally 
restricted the detainees’ right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and 
unless Congress specifically suspended the right to habeas corpus under the 
Suspension Clause, the detainees still retained this right.238 
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 
2009,239 which President Obama signed into law, in an attempt to address 
these issues.240  The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and others 
still had some concerns that it fails to bring the tribunals in line with the 
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Geneva Conventions and the United States Constitution.241  The executive 
branch has been operating under this new law, and Congress held hearings 
in 2011 to monitor its progress.242  During the first two years after 
Boumediene, federal district courts granted 19 petitions for habeas corpus 
and denied 15.243  However, in more recent years, the district courts and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have 
rejected all such petitions.244  In June of 2012, the Supreme Court rejected 
the petitions for certiorari made by seven Guantanamo detainees appealing 
the denials of their petitions for habeas corpus by the lower courts.245  The 
previous month, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who allegedly masterminded 
the September 11 attacks, was arraigned at a hearing in a military 
courtroom in Guantanamo Bay, and his trial is expected to commence next 
year.246  The saga persists. 
D. CONTINUED DEBATES BETWEEN SECURITY AND LIBERTY 
Our nation is still in the midst of struggling to balance these factors: to 
make our country as safe as possible (of course acknowledging that nothing 
is fail-proof), while at the same time preserving those fundamental values 
for which our country stands.  After the original Patriot Act was enacted 
into law, a series of additional statutes have been passed to modify 
provisions in the original law and to add and strengthen other security 
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measures.  Among others, these measures include the Cyber Security 
Research and Development Act,247 the Cyber Security Enhancement Act,248 
the Twenty-First Century Department of Justice Reauthorization Act,249 the 
Federal Information Security Management Act,250 the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Protection Act,251 and the USA Patriot Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act.252  Congress continues to hold hearings on the Patriot 
Act and other related statutes and issues.253  On May 26, 2011, several 
amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that had 
been enacted as part of the Patriot Act were extended by Congress.254  A 
vast array of governmental, academic, non-profit, and for-profit entities 
continue to focus on legal and policy issues surrounding the government’s 
actions to prevent further acts of terrorism and countervailing concerns 
about protection of rights and freedoms.255 
During 2012, the American Bar Association – which has been a leader 
in debating these issues and keeping them in the forefront of the American 
public policy discussions – has published a multipart series in the ABA 
Journal highlighting some of these continuing controversies under the 
caption of “Patriots Debate:  The Meaning of the Constitution in a Time of 
Terror.”256  The series includes articles depicting various viewpoints on 
topics such as the war powers of Congress and the President,257 targeted 
killings of terrorists, cyber warfare, coerced interrogations, domestic 
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terrorism, and national security letters.258  The July 2012 issue features an 
article entitled “Insider Threats: Experts Try to Balance the Constitution 
with Law Enforcement to Find Terrorists.”259  It notes “[h]ere, the issue is 
whether the training and intelligence-gathering activities of law 
enforcement officials are sufficiently balanced against constitutional 
protections of religious and political thought.  And do law enforcement 
tactics and policies encourage Muslim-Americans to help weed out the 
troublemakers, or do they encourage continued racial stereotypes?”260  The 
ABA’s Standing Committee on Law and National Security is publishing a 
new book entitled PATRIOTS DEBATE:  CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN 
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, on which the series of articles is based. 
These national deliberations persist within the nation’s capital and 
throughout the United States.261  Lawyers continue to defend the rule of 
law, due process, the powers of the presidency and of Congress, individual 
rights and liberties, and all look to various interpretations of the 
Constitution to justify their positions.  Some celebrate the fact that the 
government has not implemented some of the more egregious responses to 
this crisis that it has in reaction to previous national crises.262  Others 
highlight the new forms of government infringements upon rights and 
freedoms, which are of equal concern as those in the past.263 
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Former Vice President Dick Cheney, in releasing his new book shortly 
before the 10th anniversary of September 11, stated one of the greatest 
accomplishments of his service under the Bush Administration is the United 
States did not have another September 11 type attack on United States soil 
for the rest of the administration’s tenure, and he attributes that success to 
the enhanced governmental powers that his administration initiated.264  
However, in response to a similar assertion about the absence of subsequent 
attacks, Republican Congressman Bob Barr noted:  “It’s always difficult to 
disprove a negative,” and he highlighted:  “You can’t legitimately say that 
it’s because of the expanded powers . . . that we haven’t had another 
terrorist attack.”265  He indicated that the fact the United States has not 
experienced another major terrorist attack may well be because of increased 
public awareness and because the government has learned from the 
mistakes it had made before September 11.266  He has continued to oppose 
various provisions of the Patriot Act and other government actions in the 
wake of the attacks.267 
V. CONCLUSION 
During the symposium in Bismarck, we explored some of the 
fundamental rights and values that are enshrined in the United States 
Constitution, as well as some of the challenges to those liberties that have 
arisen during times of national crisis.  As discussed above, the United States 
is still in the midst of struggling to balance national security with 
fundamental liberties.  Our three branches of government are at the center 
of this struggle.  Congress, in passing the Patriot Act and subsequent 
reauthorizations, the Military Commissions Acts, and other measures.  The 
President, in spearheading both enactment and rigorous implementation of 
the Patriot Act and using all methods that he views are at his disposal to 
combat terrorism.  And the Supreme Court, in striving to ensure that 
sufficient checks and balances remain and that the rights and values 
enshrined in our Constitution are upheld even during this latest national 
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crisis.  It is important to note that the President and members of Congress 
also swear to protect and uphold the Constitution. 
The rule of law and the United States Constitution have been 
significantly affected by the inevitabilities of the post-September 11 world, 
and by the need to use new methods to counter new forms of terrorism and 
warfare.  Yet we must also be conscientious about how we are meeting 
these new challenges, whether all of the new governmental powers are 
necessary or even effective, what privacies and freedoms we are giving up 
in accepting these new powers, and whether some of them may have gone 
too far in eroding the constitutionally protected freedoms that we cherish in 
our country. 
Some of the original provisions of the Patriot Act have lapsed or have 
been overturned by the courts, but the government has still retained much 
greater power than it had before September 11.  We may now be living in a 
new era, where we will have to grapple with how much of our civil liberty 
we are willing to sacrifice and hand over to the government for an indefinite 
period of time.268  It is crucial to recall that the restrictions on civil liberties 
that occurred during previous national emergencies subsequently abated 
when the crisis was over.269  But how long will the current crisis last?  Will 
it ever have a definitive end?  How much of our freedom do we want to 
sacrifice?  What margin of greater security do these sacrifices truly enable 
us to enjoy?  How should we continue to contend with the strains on the US 
Constitution that have come in the aftermath of September 11, while at the 
same time taking the actions that are warranted to protect national security?  
Will the pendulum gradually swing back toward a greater respect for 
individual rights, civil liberties, and limited government?  These are 
questions that we will all continue to confront long into the future.  One 
factor providing significant optimism in facing these momentous questions 
is the very fact that committed and thoughtful people are engaging in these 
discussions throughout the United States, as exemplified by the event held 
in North Dakota on the eleventh anniversary of September 11.  As long as 
these conversations continue, they will help to ensure that the pendulum 
will not sway too far, for too long, toward one side or the other, but that an 
appropriate balance will soon be brought back into equilibrium. 
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